La limitación del recurso de apelación en los juicios por honorarios profesionales y su incidencia en el principio constitucional a recurrir.

Abstract

Lawyers see with great concern how the num. 6 of art. 333 of the General Organic Code of Processes (COGEP) discriminates against us by denying us the constitutional right to appeal the sentences that are pronounced within the trials in which the controversies between the lawyer and client for the payment of professional fees are aired, highlighting this legal provision that appeals cannot be lodged against these sentences, not even in fact, which prevents us from reviewing our sentence by an appeal judge in the event that it is unfavorable to our interests. In this sense, the general objective of the present work is to analyze and establish how the num. 6 of art. 333 of the COGEP violates the constitutional principle of appealing the ruling or resolution in all procedures in which it is decided on our rights guaranteed in lit. m) of no. 7 of art. 76 of the Constitution. The methodology used has a qualitative approach, since it plans to study the aforementioned constitutional principle, establishing its scope, its recognition as a principle and guarantee in our Constitution and in international instruments, and how the restriction of this right is unconstitutional and discriminatory within summary trials for collection of professional fees. The results of the case study show that the num. 6 of art. 333 of the COGEP is discriminatory and violates the rights to due process and defense, so it is concluded that the unconstitutionality of this article should be sued.