Iura Novit Curia en la garantía de motivación y el vicio de incogruencia.

Abstract

The principle iura novit curia gives judges the power to apply the correct legal rules, even if they have not been invoked by the parties. However, this power is not absolute, as it is limited by the dispositive principle and the principle of congruence. The dispositive principle establishes that the judicial process is governed by the claims put forward by the parties, while the principle of congruence requires that the judicial decision remains within the limits of what has been requested and proven in the process. The correct application of iura novit curia requires that judges respect the facts alleged and the claims formulated, avoiding the vices of infra petita, ultra petita and extra petita inconsistency, which affect effective judicial protection and due process. Furthermore, the Constitutional Court of Ecuador has identified inconsistency with regard to the parties and with regard to the law as motivational defects that can invalidate a judicial decision if the judge omits to consider relevant arguments or incorrectly applies a rule. In this way, the principle of iura novit curia contributes to the correct application of the law, but always in harmony with the procedural guarantees that safeguard the rights of the parties.